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In our paper, we study the vulnerability in cascading failures of the real-world network (power grid) under intentional attacks. Here,
we use three indexes (B, K , k-shell) to measure the importance of nodes; that is, we define three attacks, respectively. Under these
attacks, we measure the process of cascade effect in network by the number of avalanche nodes, the time steps, and the speed of the
cascade propagation. Also, we define the node’s bearing capacity as a tolerant parameter to study the robustness of the network
under three attacks. Taking the power grid as an example, we have obtained a good regularity of the collapse of the network
when the node’s affordability is low. In terms of time and speed, under the betweenness-based attacks, the network collapses
faster, but for the number of avalanche nodes, under the degree-based attack, the number of the failed nodes is highest. When
the nodes’ bearing capacity becomes large, the regularity of the network’s performances is not obvious. The findings can be
applied to identify the vulnerable nodes in real networks such as wireless sensor networks and improve their robustness against
different attacks.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, people’s daily life is increasingly dependent on
electricity, but the failures and blackout happened in the elec-
tricity system has resulted in heavy losses and a huge impact
on people’s lives. There are a lot of famous examples like the
massive power failure on the West Coast of United States in
September 2011, the breakdown of Ukraine’s electricity sys-
tem under malicious attacks and the blackout in New York
city in July 2019, and the massive power failure on the U.S.
West Coast in 2019. Therefore, to this day, the research on
the power grid is still hot. The current research on network
robustness mainly includes these aspects: research based on
power grid structure, analysis based on cascading effects,
how to identify network attacks, and how to defend network
attacks.
In terms of structural analysis, Huang [1] et al. (2013)
used the theory of complex networks and obtained the distri-
bution of risk energy along the path in the vulnerability anal-
ysis of cascading faults considering branch structures. Based
on graph theory technology, Correa [2] et al. (2013) obtained
the applicability conclusion of the graph theory method for
the vulnerability of power grids by comparing the physical
flow model and the statistical indicators of scale-free graphs.
Based on the normalization effect of neighboring nodes and
the weight distribution of nodes in the network, Wang [3]
et al. (2014) studied the different roles of low-load and
high-load nodes and the relationship between some parame-
ters in the network and the strongest level of robustness.
Finally, through numerical simulation, they obtained the
parameter values corresponding to the model at the strongest
level of robustness. Ouyang [4] et al. (2014) used the
betweenness based-model (BBM), direct current power flow
model (DCPFM), and purely topological model(PTM) to
study network robustness under intentional attacks based
on betweenness, degree, importance, and maximum traffic.
Yang [5] et al. (2015) discussed the relationship between
community structure and network robustness and proposed
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a three-step strategy to improve network robustness while
maintaining the degree distribution and the structure of the
network community.
In terms of analysis based on cascading effects, consider-
ing the traffic load, Tan [6] et al. (2015) used the Barabasi-
Albert scale-free network and interdependent Erdos-Renyi
random graph to research the effect of the coupling mode
on the cascade effect. Through research, Erdos-Renyi ran-
dom graphs are fragile and robust. However, the interdepen-
dent Barabasi-Albert scale-free network is vulnerable to
intentional attacks and the random attacks. These results
are similar for interdependent communication networks
and power grids, for the nonvulnerability under intentional
attacks and the actual interdependent system. Cai [7] et al.
(2016) analyzed the complex effects of cascading faults by
modeling the interdependence between power systems and
dispatch data networks. Their simulation results show that
under random attacks, the probability of catastrophic failure
of the power grid combined with the mesh structure is higher
than that with a double-star structure; while under inten-
tional attacks, the transmission performance of the mesh net-
work is better than that of the double-star structure. Hai-
PengRen [8] et al. (2016) proposed a new load distribution
for the cascade effect and a node removal rule, that is, in
the opposite direction of the flow, removing the first overload
node, and then the network distributes the load and con-
tinues cascading process. This method has proven to sup-
press large-scale cascading failures. According to the
maximum flow theory, Wenli [9] et al. (2016) proposed a
model of cascading failure. Their results show that the node
load distribution has a great impact on the cascading dynam-
ics and the tolerance parameter threshold. Kornbluth [10]
et al. (2018) use the node’s betweenness centrality as the load
to research the cascading effect of the network when the
node’s load is overloaded. They study the functional relation-
ship between the initial attack and the number of surviving
nodes at the end of the cascade PF strength under different
tolerance values in Erdös-Renyi graphs and random regular
graphs.
In terms of how to identify network attacks, Yan [11]
et al. (2017) analyzed the vulnerability of the transmission
network under sequential topology attack and proposed a
method based on Q-learning. This method can identify the
critical attack sequence considering the dynamic behavior
of the physical system. Wang [12] et al. (2017) developed a
smart search method based on state-space pruning to iden-
tify incidents of cyber attacks. They used the stochastic
chemistry method and particle swarm optimization algo-
rithm and took the IEEE system as an example to verify the
efficiency and of the method. Lei [13] et al. (2020) proposed
a distributed iterative positioning algorithm based on the
abandonment strategy of the sensor relative to its neighbor’s
center of gravity coordinates. The algorithm uses relative dis-
tance calculations to locate the data packet loss through the
neighbor’s communication link. And they accurately locate
the sensor through this algorithm. Daniel [14] et al. (2020)
proposed an algorithm that shows the relationship between
the variance of the attacker’s signal and how far away the
nodes are, which solves the problem of constructing a cen-
tralized and distributed version of Nesterov with the best
fixed parameters.
In terms of how to defend network attacks, Zheng [15]
et al. (2014) proposed a weighting strategy for edges, that is,
designing the path length of the edge as the product of the
clustering coefficients of the edge nodes and calculating the
corrected neutrality center of the edge and applying it as a
weight to the cascade model. It is found that the weighting
scheme based on the modified betweenness centrality makes
the three networks of the modular network, scale-free net-
work, and small-world network all better than the original
betweenness centrality networks that are more robust against
edge attack. Liu [16] et al. (2015) found two ways to reduce
the system vulnerability: (1) protect nodes with high degree
and (2) increase the degree of correlation between networks.
Guo [17] et al. (2017) proposed a vulnerability analysis
method using the Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS)
model composed of the physical layer, network layer, and




Figure 2: The definition of k-shell. Removing all the nodes with
degree 1 and repeating this step until there are no nodes with
degree 1 in the grid. Then, define their value of k-shell as 1
(k − shell = 1), which is the outer circle in the figure. Next,
continue to remove the node with a degree of 2. As described
above, the k-shell value of the removed nodes is defined as 2




Figure 1: The evolution process of cascading faults in the network
model.
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the performance index of the model before and after the cas-
cade failure. By comparing different attack strategies and
interface strategies, they concluded that CPPS should protect
high-indexed nodes and is more vulnerable to malicious
attacks. Wang [18] et al. (2018) proposed a strategy to defend
against cyber attacks by studying electronic computing phys-
ical systems (ECPSs). Besides, they also provided a weight
adjustment strategy to work out the problem of unbalanced
current caused by the split event. In the paper, their assess-
ment of vulnerability has five aspects: robustness, economic
cost, degree of damage, fragile equipment, and trigger points.
Ma [19] et al. (2019) proposed a scale-free network model
that can more effectively control the propagation of cascad-
ing faults. In their model, the connection load of any two
nodes is defined, taking into account the degree and interme-
diateness of the nodes. Irshaad [20] et al. (2019) combined
cognitive dynamic and state estimation systems in the smart
network and proposed a new SG metric: entropy state. The
manager achieves the goal of improving the entropy state
by reconfiguring the weights of the sensors in the grid and
dynamically optimizing the state estimation process. And
CDS is the best choice for monitoring systems.
It can be seen from the above literature review that
scholars understand the network structure and cascading
effects and use sensors to identify attacks and defend them.
In this article, we default to the identification of sensors
and attach importance to defense to protect high-load nodes.
However, rather than studying structural defenses, we value
the impact of the network after an attack. We recorded not
only the number of nodes in the network that crashed but
also the speed and time of the crash. Because we believe that
under the technical recognition of sensors, understanding the
law of network collapse is of great practical significance for
future defenses.
We break this article into three sections. In Section I, we
will introduce the load distribution model of the network. In
Section II, we will show three attacks. In Section III, we will
list some indicators to show the extent to which the network
is crashing. In Section IV, we will present the results graphi-
cally and analyze them. Finally, we will give the conclusion.
2. Results and Discussion
2.1. The Cascading Failure Model
2.1.1. Load Distribution Model. It can be seen from multiple
studies that the load of a node is often estimated by the node’s
betweenness centrality [21, 22]. Therefore, in our paper, we
set the betweenness centrality of the node as its load.
In reality, when a node is crashed by an attack, its load is
distributed to other nodes in the network [23]. There are two
























































Figure 3: Under B attack, the figure shows howmany nodes failed in the network (color shades) at time t (axis Y) when p nodes were attacked
(axis X), where the range of p is 5 to 200, with an interval of 5 nodes. (a) is an image with α equal to 0.2. (b) is an image with α equal to 0.4. (c)






































































Figure 4: UnderK attack, the figure shows howmany nodes failed in the network (color shades) at time t (axis Y) when p nodes were attacked
(axis X), where the range of p is 5 to 200, with an interval of 5 nodes. (a) is an image with α equal to 0.2. (b) is an image with α equal to 0.4. (c) is






































































Figure 5: Under k-shell attack, the figure shows how many nodes failed in the network (color shades) at time t (axis Y) when p nodes were
attacked (axis X), where the range of p is 5 to 200, with an interval of 5 nodes. (a) is an image with α equal to 0.2. (b) is an image with α equal to
0.4. (c) is an image with α equal to 0.6. (d) is an image with α equal to 0.8.
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distribution. Global distribution seems to be more compre-
hensive, but in actual research, global distribution calculation
is huge, and in global distribution, the load is distributed in
inverse proportion to the distance. On the contrary, distrib-
uting load to neighboring nodes is effective and reasonable.
On the one hand, it can show the level after the collapse of
the network. On the other hand, calculations are greatly
reduced. Local distribution is not single, for example, using
game theory [24]. Consequently, we adopt the local distribu-
tion method of node load distribution to its neighboring
nodes after a node fails in this article, which is more suitable
for research.
As shown in Figure 1, when the node i crashes, it allo-
cates its own load to its neighboring node set j in a certain
form. When a node is a neighboring node that exceeds its
maximum load, the node fails and continues to be distrib-
uted to its neighboring nodes, which results in the cascade
effect. Until the assigned nodes in the network do not
exceed the maximum load, the process of cascading faults
stops [25].
2.1.2. Cascade-Related Indicators. To measure the cascading
effect of the network, you need to define some relevant
indicators.
First of all, as mentioned above, we define the initial load
(L) of node i [26] as the node’s betweenness centrality (B).
Li 0ð Þ = Bi: ð1Þ
Secondly, define the maximum load (C) that the node can
withstand [27]. The definition is as follows:
Ci = 1 + αð ÞLi 0ð Þ: ð2Þ
In the formula, α is a tunable parameter, ranging from 0
to 1, indicating the performance of the nodes [28]. The larger
the value of α, the better the load-carrying capacity of the
node.
The next is how to distribute. At time t, as node i failed,
its neighboring node k increases the load (ΔLk) as
ΔLk tð Þ =
Bi
∑Bj
Li t − 1ð Þ, ð3Þ
where k is any node of set j. The load distributed from the
node i is added to each neighboring node. If the one of neigh-
boring nodes exceeds its maximum load, the node fails [29].














































Figure 6: Under three attack strategies, the total number of the failed nodes N ðaxisYÞ is after attacking p nodes (axis X). (a) is an image with
α equal to 0.2. (b) is an image with α equal to 0.4. (c) is an image with α equal to 0.6. (d) is an image with α equal to 0.8.
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2.1.3. Simulated Attack Model. In general, our model is to
achieve intentional attacks in reality by selecting high-load
nodes to attack. After being attacked, the attacked node will
distribute its load to neighboring nodes, that is, using the pre-
vious load distribution model. When any neighboring node’s
load exceeds its capacity, it will collapse and continue to dis-
tribute its load, thus form a series of chain reactions [30, 31].
And we will simulate this process through a computer to get
our final conclusion.
2.2. Three Attack Strategies. We examine the survivability of
the network under intentional attacks [32] in this article.
Under intentional attacks, important nodes in the network
will be attacked. Important nodes are often measured by
the node’s betweenness centrality, degree [33], k-shell [34]
value, etc. Therefore, we study three attacks that sort these
three metrics in descending order to attack. The three attacks
are as follows:
(1) Betweenness attack (B attack): based on the above-
mentioned distribution method, we sort all nodes in
descending order of the betweenness centrality, then
attack the top nodes
(2) Degree-based attack (K attack): The nodes to be
attacked are arranged in descending order of degrees,
and the rest are the same as the betweenness-based
attack
(3) k-shell-based attack: keep the other conditions the
same and arrange the attacked nodes in descending
order according to the value of k-shell. For the defini-
tion of k-shell, see the Figure 2 below
Attack the nodes according to these three attacks, and
then through certain indicators [35], we can see the degree
of network collapse. Next, we will introduce the evaluation
indicators.
2.3. Evaluation Indicators. Obviously, the degree of network
collapse [36, 37] is bound up with the number of nodes that
fail. The quantity available is an important indicator. On the
other hand, due to the cascading effect, the moments when
different nodes fail are not necessarily the same. Therefore,
we must first define the time of the cascade. With quantity
and time, we naturally think of another indicator—speed.
Below, we will explain these three indicators in detail.
(1) Time: As for the time, we define the time of the attack
as the moment 0 (t = 0), the time of the neighboring
nodes fail caused by the attacked nodes as the
moment 1(t = 1), and so on to define the cascade
moment. In addition, what we can get from this is




















































Figure 7: Under three attack strategies, the number of remaining nodes r (axis Y) is after attacking p nodes (axis X). (a) is an image with α
equal to 0.2. (b) is an image with α equal to 0.4. (c) is an image with α equal to 0.6. (d) is an image with α equal to 0.8.
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that the last moment recorded is the time (t) used for
the cascade effect
(2) The number of failed nodes: Aiming to analyze the
collapse of the network in the cascade effect process,
we count the nodes that fail at different times (n (t)).
By adding these numbers, we can get the total number




n tð Þ: ð4Þ
(3) The number of noncrashed nodes: Knowing the total
number of nodes (M) in the power grid and the num-
ber of failure nodes, we can easy to calculate the
nodes that did not fail, excluding the number of
nodes that have attacked (p), calculated as follows:
r =M −N − p: ð5Þ
(4) Speed of cascade: Speed is the quotient of quantity (N)
and time (t). Here, the time it takes for the cascade
effect to start and end. The quantity (N) here refers
to the total number of nodes that fail. The specific for-




All in all, it is easy to know that the total number of fail-
ure nodes shows the degree of network collapse, and time and
speed show the effects of different attacks. Then, based on
these indicators, from the results, we can detect the effect of
the cascade effect of the network under different attack
conditions.
3. Result Analysis
Based on the previous model and evaluation indicators, we
test it using the U.S. grid as an example. This power grid is
a network with 4941 nodes and 6,594 edges. Here, we assume









































Figure 8: Under three attack strategies, the persistent time of cascade T (axis Y) is after attacking p nodes (axis X). (a) is an image with α equal
to 0.2. (b) is an image with α equal to 0.4. (c) is an image with α equal to 0.6. (d) is an image with α equal to 0.8.
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that the edges of the network [38] are unweighted, and the
distribution of the load is undirected.
3.1. Preliminary Analysis. As mentioned above, we will
record the number of nodes that fail at each moment in the
cascade effect. Therefore, we will initially display it in a
three-dimensional graph.
Through the adjustment of α and the adjustment of
attack modes, we can have different results. Among them,
we will find some novel conclusions. Next, we will present
them in turn.
As can be seen from the vertical perspective of Figure 3,
under the B attack, the number of nodes in the cascade effect
increases with time, showing a trend of increasing first and
then decreasing. From the horizontal perspective, as the
number of attacked nodes increases, so does the number of
collapse nodes in the cascade effect. And it can be roughly
seen that with the increasing of the number of attacked
nodes, the total time of the cascade effect generally decreases.
Next, we use the same distribution method to perform
the same operation on nodes sorted by degree (K). The result
is shown in Figure 4.
It can be seen from Figure 4 that the horizontal and ver-
tical images are roughly the same as the B attacks, but in the
K attack, when the node performance is good, that is, when α
is large, attacking a few important nodes has little impact on
the entire network.
At last, we use the k-shell to measure the importance that
is sorted by k-shell, attack the node with a large value of k-
shell, and use the same distribution method to record the
number of failure nodes, as shown in Figure 5.
It can be seen from Figure 5 that the image in the hori-
zontal and vertical directions is roughly the same as the two
modes, but compared to the previous two attack mode, this
attack mode has a large time span and shows a fault phenom-
enon, as shown in Figure 5(a). The first 40 attacked nodes
and less than 40 show roughly the same effect on the net-
work, but when the number of attack nodes is greater than
40, the result of the attack is significantly different. This
may be related to the point ordering with the same k-shell
value.
3.2. Advanced Analysis. When α is determined, in a three-
dimensional graph, we can know the time of the crash (t)
and the number of crashed nodes at different times (n (t))
and compare the network crashes that attacked different
numbers of nodes. However, we do not know whether the
final total number of crashed nodes (N) still has such









































Figure 9: Under three attack strategies, the speed of cascade effect V (axis Y) is after attacking p nodes (axis X). (a) is an image with α equal to
0.2. (b) is an image with α equal to 0.4. (c) is an image with α equal to 0.6,.(d) is an image with α equal to 0.8.
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regularity. Therefore, we introduce a two-dimensional graph
to depict the total number of crashed nodes. In addition, we
also depict time and speed accordingly.
From (a) and (b) of Figure 6, we see a strange phenome-
non, and the more attacked nodes, the fewer the number of
failed nodes. This is counterintuitive. However, there is a
possible reason to explain this phenomenon; that is, the node
that was attacked at the beginning is closely related to the
nodes that are added later. The load allocated by the previous
crashed node causes the subsequent node to fail. On how to
answer this question, we draw a graph of the number of
nodes without fail [39] (Figure 7). It turns out that for both
the k-shell and the B attack, this explanation is feasible. As
for how to explain the K attack, at this time, we should con-
sider the phenomenon that the neighboring nodes fail at the
same time, and the load cannot be distributed. Whether it is
caused by one or both, we can conclude that, based on the
previous model, increasing the number of attack nodes does
not necessarily lead to an increase in network crash, espe-
cially for the B attack.
From Figures 6 and 7, we have not reached a good con-
clusion. However, from a time and speed perspective, we
found good results. It can be seen from Figures 8 and 9 that
when α is small, the speed and time of collapse reflect a better
law. As the number of attacked nodes increases, the time
spent by cascade effect decreases, and the speed of collapse
increases. In addition, among the three attacks, the B attack
has the shortest time and the fastest speed, followed by the
K attack. When α is greater than or equal to 0.6, the volatility
of the data is larger, and the law is not very obvious, but it can
still be seen that the B attack is more destructive to the power
grid.
From this, we reasonably guess that the size of the alpha
has an effect on the number of nodes that fail. To do this,
we set α as the independent variable [40], set the number of
failure nodes as the dependent variable, and plot the results
as follows.
It can be seen from Figure 10 that as the value of α
increases, the number of failure nodes decreases. But as for
the B attack and the K attack, the reduction trend is not obvi-
ous. Nevertheless, some phenomena can be found from
them. As you can see from Figure 10(a), that when attacking
50 nodes, no matter how large α, the number of nodes fail by
the betweenness-based attack is greater than the k-shell
attack. However, when the number of attacks increased, there
was almost no difference in the number of failure nodes by
the two modes. When the number of attacked nodes is 200,
the number of failure nodes by the k-shell attack is greater












































Figure 10: The total number of the failure nodesN (axis Y) is with different α (axis X). (a) is an image with attacking 50 nodes. (b) is an image
with attacking 100 nodes. (c) is an image with attacking 150 nodes. (d) is an image with attacking 200 nodes.
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than that of the B attack. On the other hand, the number of
failure nodes in the network is closely related to the load
capacity of the nodes for the K attack. In this case, improving
the node’s performance is very effective to ensure network
security.
4. Conclusions
Through the above studies, we can draw some preliminary
conclusions about the cascade effect. The specific conclusions
will be listed in the following points.
(1) From the preliminary analysis, it can be roughly seen
that at any time t, as the number of attacked nodes
increases, so does the number of failure nodes, and
the total crash time decreases
(2) However, Figures 6 and 7 show that the increase in
the number of attacked nodes does not result in an
increase in the total number of crashed nodes and a
decrease in the number of noncrashed nodes. Based
on the data of the number of crashed and noncrashed
nodes, compared with the three attack methods, B
attack is affected more
(3) Combined with the crash time and crash speed, it can
be seen that the B attack has the fastest crash speed
and the shortest crash time. Therefore, it can be
known that in the B attack mode, the robustness of
the network is the lowest, especially when α is small
(4) Improving the load-carrying capacity of a node is a
good protection measure. Judging from the results,
the load-carrying capacity of nodes has more influ-
ence on the degree of network collapse than the
number of attack nodes, especially in K attack
(5) When the alpha is small, the cascading effect takes
less time and is faster than the k-shell under the K
attack. However, the number of failure nodes under
the K attack is less than that of k-shell. Therefore,
we cannot conclude that the K attack is stronger. If
it is assumed that there is no way to intervene before
the cascade effect stops, then the k-shell attack can be
considered stronger
(6) When α is large and there are many attacked nodes,
based on our model, our conclusions above may no
longer be applicable
In the above conclusions, the results have revealed the
topological vulnerability of cascade in the power grid systems
under different attacks and could be used to design the robust
topology of wireless sensor networks [41, 42]. The under-
standing of the process of network collapse is conducive to
better erection and use of sensor detection. Under certain
measures, this is a favorable measure to deal with the network
cascade effect. But for other real networks [43–48], the results
are maybe different. So, we will study the vulnerability in
other real-world networks with considering the community
structure [49] in the future.
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